Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Valley Bank & Trust Company v. Helen Chlepa :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Richard c. Dibblee; Attorney for Appellant;Harold A. Hintze; Attorney for Respondant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Valley Bank v. Chlepas, No. 16787 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2006

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
the Personal Representative
with Will Annexed of the
Estate of Penelope Kopoulos,
PlaintiffAppellant,

Case No. 16787

VS.

HELEN CHLEPAS,
DefendantRespondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, JUDGE

Harold A. Hintze
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-7751
Attorneys for Respondent
Richard C. Dibblee
ROBERTS, BLACK & DIBBLEE
400 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 363-3550
Attorneys for Appellant

nn
rn.AD
"\

1

., '7 198,,'O

Jilf11f,iiat•••""""••,6li>•'"'"''" .... _~ ' ' ..

iy ·',

·Clor~ti
Su;:i1•:y1::~,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the
Institute
of Museum
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE S TA TE OF UTAH

VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
the Personal Representative
with Will Annexed of the
Estate of Penelope Kopoulos,
PlaintiffAppellant,

Case No. 16787

VS.

HELEN CHLEPAS,
DefendantResponden t.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, JUDGE

Harold A. Hintze
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-7751
Attorneys for Respondent
Richard C. Dibblee
ROBERTS, BLACK & DIBBLEE
400 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 363-3550
Attorneys for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT .

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

4

POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT CONSTRUING UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
SECTION 75-6-104(1) . . . . . . . .

POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
REFUSING TO FIND THAT THE ESTATE'S
ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE DECEASED'S
ILLITERACY ALTERED THE PRESUMPTION
OF VALIDITY OF THE JOINT TENANCY
WRITTEN CONTRACTS .
CONCLUSION .

.

4

15
20

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-i-OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

CASES CITED
Page
Greener v. Greener, 160 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194 (1949).

s

Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 P.2d 715 (1934)

15

Johnson v. Allen, 158 P.2d 134 (Utah 1945)

19

Maltby v. Sumner, 219 P.2d 395 (Kan. 1950)

19

McCullough v. Wasserback, 30 Utah 2d 398, 518 P.2d 691
(1974)

. . • . . . . . . .

10

Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452 (Utah 1975)

7,9

Paulsen v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P.2d 621 (1953). .

5

Sutherland v. Sutherland, 358 P.2d 766 (Kan. 1961)

. .

Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 P.2d 179 (1961)

18
6,9

AUTHORITIES CITED
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 149 "Contracts" pp. 490-9 .

18

25 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 43, p. 403

19

. . . .

. . . .

37 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 437, pp. 596-7

19

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated, Section 75-6-104(1)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4,6

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
the Personal Representative
with Will Annexed of the
Estate of Penelope Kopoulos,
PlaintiffAppellant,

Case No. 16787

vs.
HELEN CHLEPAS,
DefendantResponden t.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff, as the personal representative with Will annexed
of the estate of Penelope Kopoulos, brought an action to determine
the ownership of two certificates of deposit issued in the name
of the deceased, Penelope Kopoulos, and the defendant Helen
Chlepas, as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Judge, Honorable Dean E. Conder, sitting without a jury, found the issues in favor of the defendant and against
the plaintiff.

The Trial Court entered Findings of Fact and
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Conclusions of Law, and based thereon entered a Judgment awarding
defendant the certificates of deposit free and clear of any claim
by the estate.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the Judgment
entered in this matter.

Respondent seeks to have this Court

affirm the decision of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Penelope Kopoulos died testate on February 24, 1977.

At

t~

time of her death there existed two savings certificates (total
face value of $60,000.00) held in joint tenancy with full rights
of survivorship with the defendant Helen Chlepas.

Those certifi-

cates had been taken out three years prior to the death of
Penelope Kopoulos.
Penelope was married to George Kopoulos.

Both were of

Gre~

ancestry and lived in the United States from 1934 until their
respective deaths.

George Kopoulos died in 1973.

At the time of

his death a joint English will of George and Penelope was admitted
to probate.

In addition, the following joint tenancy accounts

existed between George and Penelope and passed to Penelope upon
George's death by right of survivorship:
1)

A Lockhart Co. Diamond Thrift Certificate
No. 7216 for $2,000 to George J. Kopoulos
or Penelope Kopoulos.

2)

An American Savings & Loan Association
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...

...

...

Certifi9ate No. HOCD40267 for $10,014.82
to George J. Kopoulos and Penelope Kopoulos.
3)

Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association
Savings Certificate No. 311055 for $18,369.91
to George J. Kopoulos and Penelope Kopoulos.

4}

A joint tenancy certificate with George
Kopoulos which was cashed to open a joint
checking account with Helen Chlepas as
joint tenant.

Penelope served as the Executrix of George's estate and
signed the Affidavit of Appraisal for inheritance tax purposes
regarding the joint tenancy certificates.
After George's death Penelope placed their

re~idence

for

sale and signed all of the customary English-written documents
relating to listing, sale and conveyance of the property as
follows:
1)

Signed a listing agreement with Liljenquist
Realty

2}

(P. 3 of Exhibit 8).

Signed an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase

3)

Signed a Warranty Deed conveying the
property

4)

(Diamant's testimony).

(piamant's testimony).

Signed a Receipt for Disbursement checks
and seller's Closing Statement

(Exhibit 8).

The proceeds from the sale of this residence were used by
Penelope to purchase the two joint tenancy certificates herein
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sued upon.
Chlepas.

The joint tenancy was created by Penelope with Helen
Helen was the goddaughter of Penelope, Penelope having

no children of her own and no other close relatives.

Possession

of the joint tenancy certificates was given to Helen Chlepas on
the day of their creation and remained with her throughout
Penelope's remaining life and until placed into court for determination of ownership.

The interest on the joint tenancj accoun~ li

was used during the lifetime of Penelope to pay her living and
maintenance expenses.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

a

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT CONSTRUING
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 75-6-104(1) 1

The applicable statutory provision governing this case is
Section 75-6-104(1) of Utah Code Annotated which provides as
follows:
Sums remaining on deposit after the death of
a party to a joint account belong to the
surviving party or parties as against the
estate of the decedent unless there is clear
and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account was created.
(emphasis added)
A mere preponderance of evidence to rebut the presumption of
rightful survival ownership is insuf f icient--the statute requiri~
that the presumption must be overcome by "clear and convincing"
evidence.
1 Erroneously cited in Appellant's Brief as Section 75-6-105(1).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Clear and convincing" evidence was defined by this court in
the case of Greener v. Greener, 160 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194 (1949).
The Greener case involved a similar fact situation to the case on
appeal herein in that the validity of a joint account with rights
o~

survivorship was being challenged.

This Court, following the

common law rule, announced the intent of the parties, as established by the written joint tenancy agreement, would be presumed
and upheld unless it was shown by "clear and convincing" evidence
that the parties intended to have a different effect than that
expressed in the writing.

In a long discussion as to the meaning

of "clear and convincing" evidence, this Court stated:
... that proof is convincing which carries
with it not only the power to persuade the
mind as to the probable truth or correctness
of the fact it purports to prove, but has
the element of clinching such truth or
correctness. Clear and convincing truth
clinches what might be otherwise only probable to the mind ...

*

* *

But for the matter to be clear and convincing to a particular mind it must at
least have reached the point where there
remains no serious or substantial doubt as
to the correctness of the conclusion. A
mind which was of the opinion that it was
convinced and yet which entertained, not a
slight but a reasonable doubt as to the
correctness of its conclusion, would seem
to be in a state of confusion.
Id. at 204-05.
In the case of Paulsen v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P.2d 621
(1953)

this Court held that a written contract would only be

found void for mistake where there was clear and convincing
evidence, and that in order to be clear and convincing the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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evidence " ... must be such that there is not serious nor substantial doubt what the true intent is."

Id. at 624.

In addition, the "clear and convincing" evidence must show

i

present intention to create other than joint ownership with
survivorship rights at a specified time, that time being " ... at
of~

the time the account was created," and evidence or inference
subsequent different intent is irrelevant.

The fact that the

joint creator of the joint tenancy account may have changed her
mind as to her intentions is irrelevant to the validity of the
joint tenancy at issue here.

The rule in Section 75-6-104(1) is

essentially the same as the common law prior to 1977.

In

Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 P.2d 179 (1961), the
Court enunciated a rule similar to the present statute, and

not~

that
... such rule is applicable whether the parties
are living or where death has intervened.
Nor would the fact that the original owner
may have changed his mind after the creation
of the account alter the applicability of that
rule.
Id. at 184.
In the Tangren case the decedent had established a joint
account with the defendant.

Four days before the decedent's

death he filed an action against the defendant seeking an adjudication that the accounts were his sole property and that the
defendant had no interest therein.

Notwithstanding this obvious

change of mind on the part of the decedent, the Court upheld the
validity of the joint accounts and, as evidenced by the abovequoted cite from said case, held that the crucial time at which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the intent of the decedent is relevant is the time of the creation of the account and a subsequent change of mind does not
affect the validity of the joint account.
A recent case directly in point on this issue is Pagano v.
Walker, 539 P.2d 452 (Utah 1975).

In that case the evidence

showed that prior to her death the deceased placed $73,544.00 in
joint tenancy with one of her daughters.

Four other children of

the deceased later came into court and testified that the surviving joint tenant told each of them prior to their mother's
death that the mother had stated she wanted the joint tenant
daughter to divide the proceeds equally among all the children.
The trial court accepted such statements as evidence of an intent
not to pass ownership by survivorship to the joint tenant, and
imposed a trust on the money for the benefit of all the children.
This Court reversed that decision and upheld the joint account
stating:
The joint account is a tripartite contract
between the bank and the joint depositors;
and it is also a contract between the
joint depositors themselves.
Upon a
showing of its due execution, it is
entitled to the presumption of validity
and should be given effect according to
its terms.
That is, it creates an ownership of the funds in joint-tenancy, with
a right of survivorship so that upon the
death of one, the other becomes the
owner of the funds.
It is of course subject to attack only on the same basis as
any other written agreement or contract,
by showing that because of fraud, duress,
undue influence, mistake, incapacity or
other infirmity that in equity and good
conscience it should not be enforced. But
because of the verity accorded written
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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instruments, its effect can be overcome
only by clear and convincing evidence.

*

*

*

In order to establish such a trust,
[destroy the joint-tenancy with one daughter
and divide it up among all the children] it
would have to appear that such was the intention of the settler at the time of the
creation of the joint account.--rrhat is, if
the account was originally created as a true
joint account with right of co-ownership and
survivorship in Mary [daughter], as it
appears to have been, that status would not
be changed even if the mother Lucy had at
some subsequent time orally made the hereinabove quoted declaration to Mary.
Id. at 454-55.
(emphasis is that of the
Court and not added by this writer)
The estate's sole evidence in this case that the deceased
did not intend to create a joint tenancy account and that her
godchild Helen Chlepas received the funds by survivorship was the
testimony, received over the objection of the defendant, that
eleven days prior to her death the deceased allegedly met with an
attorney for the purpose of preparing a new will (not the one
herein admitted to probate) wherein she reallocated or made a
different distribution of her estate than would be effective if
the joint tenancy certificates remained in force at her.death.
The will was never prepared and never signed or executed.
trial court found, in regards to said evidence:
4.
The estate introduced evidence that on
or about February 13, 1977 (eleven days prior
to her death), the decedent met with an attorney
for the purpose of preparing a new Will and
there gave instructions concerning the distribution of her property which, on its face, infers
a different intent than manifest on the jointtenancy certificates insofar as distribution of
her entire estate is concerned.
The proposed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The

new Will, however, was never prepared nor
executed by the deceased prior to her death.
5.
The estate offered no evidence of any
intention at the time the joint accounts were
opened to create a relationship any different
than that expressed on the contracts themselves,
to wit:
that ownership of the certificates was
in the deceased and the defendant as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship.
6.
The court finds no evidence that at the
time the accounts were created the deceased was
acting under duress, fraud, undue influence or
incapacity, or that the parties intended an
agreement any different than that expressed on
the face of the certificates.
The court finds
no evidence which would justify equitable
reformation of the certificates.
Findings of Fact, Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.
In doing so, the District Court correctly followed and
applied the following rules laid down by this Court:
Tangren:
"Nor would the fact that the original
owner may have changed his mind after the
creation of the account alter the applicability
of that rule."
Id.
Pagano:
"In order to establish such a trust, it
would have to appear that such was the intention
of the settler at the time of the creation of the
joint account. lfihat is-;-I°f the account was
originally created as a true joint account with
rights of co-ownership and survivorship in Mary,
as it appears to have been, the status would not
be changed even if the mother Lucy had at some
subsequent time orally made the hereinabove
quoted declaration to Mary."
Id.
Not only did the estate fail to offer "clear and convincing"
evidence of a different intent "at the time of creation of the
account," the trial record shows evidence that the account was
indeed established for purpose of creating a survivorship/ownership intent.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
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Under the most recent case of this Court dealing with the
identical issues as are involved herein, "possession" of the
passbook or certificates was a significant indicia of ownership/
survivorship rights.

In the case of McCullough v. Wasserback,

30 Utah 2d 398, 518 P.2d 691 (1974)

the decedent created a joint

tenancy account with the defendant four years prior to her death,
and two weeks before she died and at a time when she was ill and
going to the hospital she delivered possession of the
to the defendant.

certifica~s

This Court, in upholding the validity of the

joint tenancy account, said that such conduct (possession) was
persuasive by noting:
If there is merit to plaintiff's [the estate]
argument that Anna's [the deceased] keeping
possession of the passbook and certificate
shows an intention to retain ownership, there
is also merit to defendant's [the survivor]
argument that turning them over to her before
she went to the hospital indicates recognition
of the joint ownership and right of survivorship.
Id. at 694.
This Court in upholding the joint tenancy account further noted:
We can see no possible justification for
saying that it was 'solely for convenience'
in handling Anna's [the deceased] money to
put it jointly in Joyce's [the survivor]
name four years prior to going to the
hospital, or to turn possession over to
Joyce.
Id. at 694.

(emphasis added)

In this case the deceased gave the passbooks to her goddaughter on the day they were created, and more than three years
prior to her death, and the goddaughter had them in her possession
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until placed into this Court for determination of ownership.
In addition, the record shows that the deceased was very
close to her goddaughter, Helen Chlepas, and that said goddaughter was the natural object of her bounty and affection.
Without any family or relatives to turn to, the deceased relied
upon her religious obligation, right and responsibility of godmother and godchild relationship with Helen Chlepas, and Helen
took an interest in and care of the deceased and a bond developed
between them that was very evident in the record.

Another relative

testified and described the relationship between the deceased and
Helen Chlepas as follows:

Q.

A.

(By Mr. Hintze)
Were you able to personally
observe any type of a relationship existing
between those two individuals?
·Do you mean before her death or after?

Q.

Before yes.

A.

They were very close.
In fact--shall I go
further back like when Helen's husband died?

Q.

Summarize after the death of Mr. Kopoulos
what you personally observed regarding those--

A.

She depended on Helen for everything.
grocery shopping ...

Q.

Just if you will, Mrs. Bowden, describe what
you observed or what you heard in relationship
to that apparent relationship.

A.

Well, I would go with Helen to Mrs. Kopoulos'
house.
Helen would take groceries to her
because she was unable to go grocery shopping.
She would ask Helen to do different things
she had in her house.
She used to talk to
her privately and I could hear because I was
just about next to her.

Before Penelope's death.

Her

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q.

How often would you say, between the death of
Mr. Kopoulos in 1973 to November of 1974, how
of ten would you observe Helen and Penelope
Kopoulos together?

A.

At least twice a week.

Q.

And would that usually occur at Mrs. Kopoulos'
home or where?

A.

Just because she was really unable to travel
unless Helen took her to a doctor's appointment or wherever she had to go.
She depended
bn Helen to take her to these places.

Q.

Were you able to hear at any time any conversation or in that relationship between Helen
and Penelope was described by either party?

A.

I

Q.

Well, you are familiar with the term Goddaughter?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you Greek Orthodox?

A.

Yes.

Q.

--by religion?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you understand what that term meant
in the Greek Orthodox religion?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You ever hear Mrs. Kopoulos speak to Helen
wherein that relationship was discussed at all?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And where did that discussion occur?

A.

Oh, at the hospital, at Helen's home, up at
the nursing home where the lady that was taking
care of Mrs. Kopoulos--

Q.

That the same conversation, which I take it
has occurred more than one time?

don't understand that.

I

sure am.

I am.

I do.
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A.

Many times.

Q.

And would that be during what period of time?

A.

Can't say specific time, but it was all the time.

Trial Transcript, pp. 58-60.
The record shows that the deceased made numerous comments of
her "intent" to "take care of Helen," an obvious reference to a
bequest of some kind.

Q.

(By Mr. Hintze)
What did Mrs. Kopoulos say
in regard to her Goddaughter?

A.

To her Goddaughter? Just kept telling her-begging her to stay with her because she had
no one else. She depended on her to do things
for her and not to leave her, because she
didn't know where to turn to. Helen kept
telling her we are not going to leave you.
There is a lot of us here to take care of
you. She called Helen words like Manaraki.

Q.

A Greek word, m·eaning what now?

A.

It's an endearment word, my dear, or darling,
or something. But this is how she referred
to Helen all the time.

Q.

At any time in those conversations at Mrs.
Kopoulos' home, or any time after George
Kopoulos' death, and say prior to November
of 1974, did you have occasion to ever hear
any conversations between Mrs. Kopoulos and
Helen Chlepas regarding whether or not Mrs.
Kopoulos was going to take care of Helen?

A.

Yes.

She always made comments like that.·

Trial Transcript, pp. 60-61.
After the creation of the joint tenancy accounts in
November of 1974, the deceased prior to her death often referred
to having left money to Helen:
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Q.

(By Mr. Hintze)
Tell us when such conversations
occurred.
Is that the first time you can recall,
as best as you can in dates?

A . . . . And the minute we would walk in the door,
she would say to Helen this word Manaraki
again. Welcome my dear, or whatever. And
she would say to her God bless her, and tell
her that she was going to take care of her.

Q.

How often did you hear that statement made?

A.

I always heard it when Helen brought her to
my house for dinner on Sundays.

Q.

Now, after November of 1974, did you ever
have occasion to receive telephone calls from
the deceased?

A.

Two or three times a week.

Q.

And what customarily would be the substance
of those conversations?

A.

Well, she would call me on the phone and say
can you get in touch with Helen? And I would
say have you tried to call her? And she would
say yes. But maybe I'm dialing wrong or something, because of some other voice would come
on--someone that was working at Helen's place.
I don't know.
So I said maybe Helen can't get
away right now.
Probably busy and has to
hire someone to work for her. And she said to
me, "Look, with what I have left, Helen, she
doesn't have to work." Always this.
I heard
this three, four times a week.

*

1

1
)

j
\,
\

JI
~i

*

*

Trial Transcript, pp. 61-62.
Clearly the Court reached the proper result in failing to
find by clear and convincing evidence an intent different from
that shown on the written joint tenancy certificates, that at t~
time they were created the intent was to pass ownership by right
of survivorship of the certificates to Helen Chlepas.
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POINT II:

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO FIND THAT THE ESTATE'S ARGUMENTS
REGARDING THE DECEASED'S ILLITERACY
ALTERED THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF
THE JOINT TENANCY WRITTEN CONTRACTS.

It should be pointed out, initially, that no allegation or
averment exists anywhere in the pleadings that the deceased
lacked capacity or other state of mind to enter into a joint
tenancy savings contract or that the joint tenancy accounts arose
through fraud, duress, mistake, or undue influence.

When the

inability of the deceased to read or write was first mentioned in
the trial, timely objection was made to that evidence.
Mr. Hintze:

May the record just show that my
objection goes to any statement
regarding the deceased's capacity
on the basis that that has not
been pled and is irrelevant. My
continuing ongoing objection on
Rule 9(d) requiring that fraud, mistake, or conditions of the mind must
be affirmatively pled.

The Court:

You may have a continuing objection
for the record.

Trial Transcript, pp. 7-8.
Without having pled lack of capacity or fraud, that issue
was never properly before the Court.
364, 39 P.2d 715 (1934)

In Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah

this Court stated:

Where there is a joint agreement execut~d by .
the parties which clearly declares the intention
to create a joint interest of each in the deposit
or credit, the courts will sustain such intention thus expressed, especially where the contract
is not attacked for fraud, mistake, incapacity, or
other infirmity.
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Where such intention is clearly expressed in a
written contract executed by the parties, which
remained unaltered, and there is no fraud, undue influence, mistake, or other infirmity
alleged, the question of intention ceases to
be an issue and the courts are bound by the
agreement.
Id. at 718-19.

(emphasis added)

The trial court properly found, in regards to the significance of the deceased's illiteracy, as follows:
3. During her lifetime the decedent did not
write or speak the English language, but it was
her practice to conduct business utilizing
the English language by having the written documents read and explained to her.
Specifically,
the evidence showed that she entered into and
signed a real estate Listing Agreement, Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, Warranty
Deed, Receipt for Disbursement & Closing Statement, and that she was familiar with the use,
creation and function of joint tenancy accounts
as she and her husband, before his death, had
numerous joint tenancy savings and/or checking
accounts.
This court has admitted to probate a
document written in the English language and
signed by the deceased as her Last Will and
Testament.

..,
~i
C'

Findings of Fact, No. 3.
Such finding is amply supported by the evidence and, in fact,
Appellant admits that such a finding is amply supported by the
evidence.
The Trial Court properly found from the
evidence in Finding of Fact No. 3 (Tr. 37):
"During her lifetime, the decedent
did not write or speak the English
language."
However, contrary to the evidence, the
following statement was included:
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"But it was her practice to conduct
business utilizing the English language
by having the written documents read and
explained to her."
Plaintiff contends that this last statement
is supported by the evidence but was not applicable to the facts involved in this case.
Appellant's Brief, p. 11.
Appellant then argues that the defendant did not prove that
she followed that established practice and explained the joint
tenancy transaction to the deceased.
that argument.

Two things are wrong with

First, Helen Chlepas cannot, by reason of the

dead man's statute, even offer such testimony and Appellant is
aware of that fact and made vehement objection to her proffered
testimony on any subject (see Trial Transcript, pp. 51-53).
Second, the burden of proof lies on the estate to establish the
fraud, mistake, or lack of capacity and not on the survivor to
show that the transaction was free of those conditions.

Further-

more, the survivor is entitled to the legal presumption of
validity of contracts executed by an illiterate individual.
The law is very clear that the illiteracy of an individual
who signed a written contract does not affect the validity or
presumption of validity of said contract unless there is evidence
of fraud.
As a general rule, one who accepts a written
contract is conclusively presumed to know
its contents and to assent to them, in the
absence of fraud, misrepresentation, or
other wrongful act by another contracting
party.

*

*

*
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The rule that one who signs a contract is
presumed to know its contents has been
applied even to contracts of illiterate
persons on the ground that if such persons
are unable to read, they are negligent if
they fail to have the contract read to them.
If a person cannot read the instrument, it
is as much his duty to procure some reliable
person to read and explain it to him, before
he signs it, as it would be to read it
before he signed i t if he were able to do so ...
(emphasis added)
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 149 "Contracts" pp. 490-9.
In Sutherland v. Sutherland, 358 P.2d 766 (Kan. 1961) the
contracting party was an elderly woman with a 4th grade education
and substantially illiterate, and suit was filed challenging a
contract to sell real property.

The court in considering the

validity of the contract stated:
The general rule is that a contracting
party is bound by an agreement to which
he assents, where the assent is uninfluenced
by fraud, violence, undue influence, or the
like, and he will not be permitted to say he
did not intend to agree to its terms.
A
contracting party is under a duty to learn the
contents of a written contract before signing
it, and if, without being a victim of fraud,
he fails to read the contract or otherwise
to learn its contents, he signs the same at
his peril and is estopped to deny his
obligations thereunder.
If a person cannot
read an instrument, it is as much his duty
to procure some reliable person to read and
explain it, before he signs it, as it would
be to read it before he signed it if he were
able to do so, and his failure to obtain a
reading and explanation of it is such gross
negligence as will estop him from avoiding
it on the ground that he was ignorant of its
contents.
Id. at 776, 785.
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see also, Maltby v. Sumner, 219 P.2d 395
v. Allen, 158 P.2d 134

(Kan. 1950); Johnson

(Utah 1945) at 137 and cases cited therein

under headnote (2.3].
No presumption of invalidity arises merely because a person
is illiterate.
Nor is a presumption of undue influence
raised merely by evidence of inability
to read or write.
25 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 43, p. 403
The party who alleges fraud as the basis
of a cause of action or defense has the
burden of establishing it by the requisite
quantum of proof in order to prevail in
the action.
Since in the absence of
particular circumstances, the presumption
is in favor of good faith, innocence and
honesty, and against fraud ...
37 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 437, pp. 5_96-7
The facts in this case clearly establish that the deceased
was able to transact business by having explained to her the
English writings to which she then assented by signing the same
or by giving instructions that documents be prepared expressing
in writing her desires and intent.
Indeed, the Appellant is hardly in a position to advance an
argument that the deceased lacked capacity to enter into written
agreements of any kind, since it is the duly appointed executor
of the estate of Penelope Kopoulos to probate a document written
in English and signed by the deceased as her Last Will and
Testament.

It would be a blatant incongruity to hold that the

illiteracy of the deceased prevented her from entering into a
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written joint tenancy agreement and thereby allow the sums
therein on deposit to be distributed pursuant to a written Will
executed by the same deceased.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly construed and applied the existing
law concerning joint tenancy accounts and, since there was no
"clear and convincing" evidence of any intent different than that
inferred by reason of the written joint tenancy account, the
judgreent in favor of the defendant should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Harold A. Hintze
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER
Attorneys for Respondent
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